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Escaping	the	Fragility	Trap?	Why	is	it	so	hard	to	think
constructively	about	fragile	states?
Duncan	Green	reviews	a	new	report	from	the	International	Growth	Centre	which	examines	how	countries	can	escape
the	trap	of	fragility.
Just	been	reading	the	report	of	the	‘Commission	on	Fragility,	Growth	and	Development’.	Hosted	by	LSE	and	Oxford’s
Blavatnik	School	of	Government;	big	name	chairs	(David	Cameron,	Donald	Kaberuka	and	the	LSE’s	Adnan	Khan).
And	I	think	it’s	a	bit	disappointing.	But	the	reasons	for	that	are	actually	quite	interesting	and	instructive.
First	the	positives.	Above	all,	the	report’s	recognition	and	ambition:	recognition	that	fragile	and	conflict	affected	states
(FCAS)	are	the	hardest	nut	to	crack	in	development,	and	require	all	the	brainpower	and	resources	possible.
Ambition,	in	that	it	reckons	the	nut	can	indeed	by	cracked.
It	has	some	good	overall	instincts,	setting	out	in	the	foreword	that	‘what	works’	in	FCAS	is	‘Realism,	not	idealism;
Local,	not	international	priorities;	Reconciliation	first,	not	elections	first	and	Working	with	governments	not	around
governments	and	Institution	building	and	nation	building.’	Paul	Collier’s	influence	shows	in	its	sensible	reminder	that
forcing	countries	emerging	from	conflict	to	run	early	elections	can	do	more	harm	than	good.
They	do	the	traditional	take-down	of	previous	attempts	to	fix	FCAS	from	outside,	arguing	that	‘received	wisdom	has
accumulated	via	three	different	processes:	quick	reactions	to	the	crises	inherent	to	fragility;	imagining	that	fragility
has	a	single	root	cause	that	can	be	addressed	by	international	intervention	or	domestic	resolution;	and	inferring
strategy	for	the	escape	from	fragility	from	the	current	characteristics	of	Western	democracies.’
Women	protest	in	the	city	center	against	President	Pierre	Nkurunziza’s	decision	to	run	for	a
third	term.	Credit:	Igor	Rugwiza	Photography	via	Flickr(https://flic.kr/p/t6P2YW_)
So	good	instincts	and	diagnosis,	although	there	is	a	tendency	to	set	up	(and	knock	down)	straw	men	rather	than
acknowledge	current	debates	and	shifts	in	donor	thinking	–	other	reviewers	have	found	little	new	in	the	report.	In	fact,
there	is	a	lot	of	rethinking	going	on	–	the	kind	of	things	I	discussed	last	year	in	a	paper	on	donor	theories	of	change
in	FCAS.
Africa at LSE: Escaping the Fragility Trap? Why is it so hard to think constructively about fragile states? Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-08-10
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/08/10/escaping-the-fragility-trap-why-is-it-so-hard-to-think-constructively-about-fragile-states/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/
The	report	gets	in	a	tangle	over	the	role	of	the	state:	‘Only	governments	can	lift	societies	out	of	fragility’,	it	declares
and	sets	out	recommendations	for	‘viable	strategies	for	national	leaders	wishing	to	begin	the	escape	from	fragility’.
But	what	if	the	government	is	either	absent,	or	predatory?	In	time-honoured	policy	wonk	fashion,	it	appears	to	be
assuming	a	can	opener	–	in	this	case	a	government	that	is	willing	and	to	some	extent	able	to	fix	things,	and	which
needs	some	help	from	outside.	Which	then	allows	them	to	set	forth	some	sensible	recommendations	for
that	government,	both	on	political	reform	and	economic	policy.
Here	are	the	headline	recommendations:	when	you’re	reading	them,	ask	yourselves,	‘what	are	the	chances	of	this
working	in	Syria,	Yemen,	Somalia	or	South	Sudan?’
For	International	Actors:
Help	build	government	that	is	subject	to	checks	and	balances	and	works	for	common	purpose
Help	build	domestic	security,	including	through	a	phase	of	international	and	regional	security
Capitalise	on	pivotal	moments
Focus	on	economic	governance,	not	policies
Use	aid	to	support	private	investment	for	job	creation
Adopt	distinctive	international	financial	institution	(IFI)	policies	for	fragile	states
Use	international	means	of	building	resilience
For	Domestic	Actors:
Establish	limited	and	purposive	long-term	goals
In	the	short-term,	look	for	quick	wins
Build	institutions	to	support	the	private	economy
Invest	in	urban	infrastructure	for	energy	and	connectivity
Use	domestic	means	of	building	resilience
The	Commission	was	hosted	at	LSE’s	International	Growth	Centre,	but	no-one	from	the	International	Development
department	(where	I	work)	was	involved,	and	I	think	it	shows:	the	literature	on	the	politics	and	political	economy	of
FCAS	is	strikingly	absent:	no	mentions	of	some	of	its	leading	current	thinkers,	as	featured	regularly	on	this	blog:	Sue
Unsworth,	David	Booth,	Brian	Levy	or	Matt	Andrews.	Even	within	the	LSE,	no	mention	of	some	of	the	relevant	big
name	professors	–	James	Putzel,	Mary	Kaldor,	Alex	de	Waal	or	David	Keen,	all	of	whom	have	written	extensively
on	crisis	states	and	conflict.
Nor	of	the	work	of	two	highly	relevant	research	initiatives	–	the	Crisis	States	Research	Network	and	CPAID	(where	I
do	one	day	a	week).The	report	also	fails	to	acknowledge	all	the	practical	experience	accumulating	within	PDIA,
Doing	Development	Differently	or	the	Thinking	and	Working	Politically	communities.
Instead	it	looks	for	lessons	from	countries	like	Uganda,	Rwanda	and	Ethiopia,	which	took	off	after	magically	acquiring
a	tin	opener	in	the	shape	of	a	nation-building	authoritarian	government	led	by	a	Kagame	or	a	Meles.
But	what	can	outsiders	(or	domestic	reformers)	do,	absent	a	providential,	well	intentioned	and	powerful	leader?	That
for	me	is	the	most	interesting,	and	urgent	question,	and	I	think	if	they	had	asked	more	of	the	researchers	named
above,	they	might	have	got	more	interesting	answers.	Options	include:
1.	 Nothing.	Accept	that	official	aid	donors	in	particular	are	helpless	to	work	in	contexts	where	their	principal	ally,
the	state,	is	not	onside.	When	a	Meles	or	Kagame	appears,	drop	everything	and	rush	to	both	help	them
transform	the	economy,	and	try	to	nudge	them	away	from	authoritarianism	(not	easy,	I	realise).
2.	 Hybrid	institutions/Working	with	the	Grain.	Invest	in	understanding	the	institutions,	both	formal	and	informal,
that	exist	in	a	given	context,	and	find	solutions	that	involve	and	strengthen	them.	See	ODI’s	great	work	on
educational	reforms	in	West	Africa	for	more	on	that,	or	Brian	Levy’s	Working	with	the	Grain.
3.	 Pockets	of	Effectiveness:	look	beyond	the	presidential	palace,	to	identify	ministries,	municipalities,	bits	of	the
judiciary	or	other	fragments	of	the	state	that	are	still	functioning	and	could	be	viable	partners.
4.	 Look	beyond	the	state	altogether:	tricky	for	official	donors,	but	there	is	a	whole	world	of	‘public	authority’	held	by
non-state	actors	like	traditional	chiefs,	faith	leaders,	civil	society	organisations	or	private	sector	bodies,	that	can
be	brought	together	to	trigger	processes	of	social	and	economic	change.
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Any	other	suggestions?
This	article	was	first	published	on	the	From	Poverty	to	Power	blog.
Duncan	Green	(@fp2p)	is	Strategic	Adviser	for	Oxfam	GB,	author	of	‘How	Change	Happens’	and	Professor	in
Practice	at	LSE.
The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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